From the viewpoint of modern contract theory, a large number of papers postulate alternative hypotheses to explain the reason why a particular contract form for land tenancy is chosen. Among these, the following researches propose the key hypotheses related to our observation in the study area. Cheung [5] and Stiglitz [14] postulate a trade-off between risk and incentives. Stiglitz [14] shows that the share tenancy contract is an optimal contract if the tenant is a risk averter and the landowner is risk neutral. Rao [11] and Allen and Lueck [2], [3] found evidence contradicting the hypothesis of risk sharing and contract choice by Cheung [5] and Stiglitz [14]. In particular, Allen and Lueck [2], [3] empirically reject Cheung and Stiglitz's hypothesis, but more recently, Ackerberg and Potticini [1] find that their regression results, taking into consideration "endogenous matching," are more compatible with the risk sharing hypothesis than the naive regression analysis conducted by Allen and Lueck [2], [3]. Alternative models contradicting the risk sharing hypothesis have also been postulated. Laffont and Matoussi [10] propose a moral hazard share tenancy model under the assumptions that tenants are risk neutral and facing financial constraints. This model predicts that tenants with less working capital tend to work under share tenancy with a lower sharing rate or wage contracts1).Basu [4] also proposes a principalagent model in which tenants are risk neutral and the contract includes a limited liability clause according to which tenants are exempted from rent payment when the harvest is below the critical level. This model predicts that a landlord will choose the share tenancy contract under which his expected income becomes larger, and the land rent under the share tenancy contract is lower than that under the fixed rent contract. All these models derive the inefficiency of resource allocation under the share tenancy contract. This indicates that these theories cannot explain the features in the real world wherein resource allocation under a share tenancy contract characterized by kinship ties is efficient (for example,Sadoulet, de Janvey and Fukui [13] for the Philippines, and Fukui, Hartono and Iwamoto [8] for our study area). The observed fact findings can be explained by a model of long-term share contract with reciprocal gift exchange under the assumption that the contract is not enforceable and the tenant is a risk averter, as shown in Sadoulet, Fukui and de Janvey [12]. If the short-run gain from cheating is smaller than the long-run gain from contract fulfillment, the tenant does not have an incentive to cheat. In such a situation, the share tenancy contract can be the optimal contract. Dubois [7] and de Janvey and Sadoulet [6] extend the theory to take into consideration the tenant's moral hazard with regard to work effort, input, and reporting output. Their models predict that if the landlord can monitor such a moral hazard of the tenant easily, the share tenancy contract is preferred by the landlord and the tenant. de Janvey and Sadoulet [6] suggest that if the landlord can reduce the tenant's moral hazard and the loss from it through a personal relationship, the optimal sharing rate of the tenant can be increased. Therefore, if we modify the gift exchange model, taking into account the possibility that mutual trust and feelings of reciprocity created through a personal relationship between the landlord and tenant, which
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In such a situation, the share tenancy contract can be the optimal contract. Dubois [7] and de Janvey and Sadoulet [6] extend the theory to take into consideration the tenant's moral hazard with regard to work effort, input, and reporting output. Their models predict that if the landlord can monitor such a moral hazard of the tenant easily, the share tenancy contract is preferred by the landlord and the tenant. de Janvey and Sadoulet [6] suggest that if the landlord can reduce the tenant's moral hazard and the loss from it through a personal relationship, the optimal sharing rate of the tenant can be increased.
Therefore, if we modify the gift exchange model, taking into account the possibility that mutual trust and feelings of reciprocity created through a personal relationship between the landlord and tenant, which will reduce the transaction cost, enforce the contract, and achieve an efficient resource allocation (Fukui, 1lartono and Iwamoto [8] and de Janvey and Sadoulet [6] ), we may be able to explain the characteristics of the land tenancy market in the study area shown in the next section.
In this paper, we examine which hypotheses can explain the determination of the land tenancy contract form in rural Central Java.
This paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a description of the data on the market structure from the viewpoint of contract theory.
Then, we explain the empirical models of tenancy contract and present the results of testing the hypotheses, based on the models in the third section. The fourth section contains the conclusion.
Land Tenancy Market in the Study Area
(1) Characteristics f Land Tenancy Market
In our study area, we were able to observe various forms of tenancy contracts (see Table 1 ). These are mainly oral contracts. As shown in Table 1 , share tenancy and fixed rent contracts were predominant forms of contract.
The number of share tenancy contracts was larger than that of fixed rent contracts in both PG and SK hamlets. There are three types of share tenancy con-tracts, namely, "Morotelu," "Morolimo," and "faro." "Morotelu" is the share contract in which the sharing rate of the tenant is one third of the gross output. The sharing rate of the tenant in " Morolimo" is forty percent of the gross output, and the sharing rate of the tenant in "faro" is fifty percent of the gross output. In the case of "Morotelu," the landowner and the tenant usually make a cost sharing arrangement in which the landowner shoulders the cost of the chemical fertilizer.
In PG hamlet, the number of "orotelu" was the largest, but it decreased as the number of "Maro" increased. In SIB hamlet, however, "Maro" was the predominant form of the share tenancy contract and it tended to increase.
In both hamlets, the number of fixed rent contracts was also large, but it stayed almost the same since we started our survey in 1998 2). In addition to share tenancy and fixed rent contracts, we observed a few cases in which land was leased out without any rent payment.
One of the remarkable features that we should stress is that share tenancy contracts were characterized by personal ties such as kinship or friendship relations while fixed rent contracts were not (Table 1) .
(2) Some Evidence on the Determinants of the Tenancy Contract examine the data on the determinants of contract form, share tenancy or fixed rent (see Table 2 ), for the Table 2 ).
In addition, we are also concerned with the three types of share tenancy contracts, namely, "Morotelu," "Molrolimo ," and "Maro," with different sharing rates. We assume that the higher the land productivity, the higher the land rent, and examine the impact of land produc- 2) Risk attitude: We use the amount of assets as a proxy of the tenant's risk attitude, based on the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion (DARA), according to which the greater the assets, the smaller the degree of risk aversion. If we compare the assets of the share tenant with that of the fixed rent tenant, we can find that the former is much smaller than the latter (item 2 of Panel A).
3) Financial constraints e use the total amount of household income and loan as a proxy of financial constraint (upper limit of working capital), following Laffont and atoussi [10] . According to the figures in item 3 of Panel A, the working capital of the share tenant is less than that of the fixed rent tenant as long as we compare the mean values.
4) Personal ties between the landowner and the tenant: As we have shown in Table 1 , the landowners made share tenancy contracts with their relatives or friends more frequently.
5) Length of contract:
The theory predicts that if the contract term is longer, it is more likely that the share tenancy contract will be chosen. As shown in item 5 of Panel A, we cannot find any significant difference between the lengths of contract for both share tenancy Table 2 shows that the higher the residual per unit area, the lower is the tenant's sharing rate. This suggests that the higher the land productivity, the more likely the sharing contract of the landlord for whom the sharing rate is higher is chosen.
Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Tenancy Contract Form (1) Test Hypotheses and Empirical Models
We test the following hypotheses as mentioned in section 1. (The sharing rate is in terms of the landowner.)
The larger the risk, the more likely that the share tenancy is chosen and the higher is the sharing rate (Cheung [5] and Stiglitz [14] ), (2) the larger the degree of risk aversion, the more likely that the share tenancy is chosen and the higher is the sharing rate (Cheung
[5] and Stiglitz [14] ),(3) the less the working capital, the more likely that the share tenancy is chosen and the higher is the sharing rate (Laffont and Matoussi
[16]), (4) the closer the distance between the landowner and the tenant, the more likely that the share tenancy is chosen and the higher is the sharing rate (de Janvey and 5adoulet [6] ), (5) the longer the length of the relationship between the landowner and the tenant, the more likely that the share tenancy is chosen and the higher is the sharing rate (de Janvey and Sadoulet [6] ), (6) if the limited liability clause is included, the share tenancy contract can be chosen and its land rent is less expensive than the fixed rent contract (Basu [4] ), and (7) (2) Estimation Results
The estimation results are presented in Table 3 .
First, column 1 of Table 3 reports Moreover, if the landowner and the tenant share kinship relations/a friendship, the higher land rent Table 3 . Results f Estimation contract is likely to be chosen. These are the major fact findings about the tenancy contract form in our study area-rural Java. However, hypothesis (2), (4), and (7) described in the previous subsection are supported by the estimation results; the hypothesis of risk sharing-hypothesis (1)-was rejected.
Finally, we were unable to find evidence that financial constraint, length of contract, and limited liability affect the contract choice and choice of share tenancy contracts.
Conclusion
In this paper, we focused on the land tenancy market in our study area-rural Java, and tried to show the determinants of the (share) tenancy contract form. In our study area, the land tenancy market was characterized by the predominance of share tenancy. We observed three types of share tenancy contracts, namely, "Mayo ," " Morollmo," and "Morotelu," each having different sharing rates.
From the estimation of the determinants of tenancy contract forms, we found that risk had a negative impact on the choice of the share tenancy contract, while the degree of risk aversion, personal ties between the landowner and tenant, and land productivity had positive effects on the choice of the share tenancy contract and the land rent. This indicates that our findings do not support the risk sharing hypothesis by Cheung [5] and Stiglitz [14] or the hypothesis by Rao [11] , Allen and Lueck [2], [3], according to which there is a positive relation between risk and incentive.
Notes
* This paper is a revised version of Fukui and Miwa [9] which leads to different conclusions. 1) This prediction is supported by the empirical study of the Tunisian case. 2) Pawning of land is categorized under the fixed rent contract in Table 1 .
3) The hypotheses related to these determinants are shown in section 3.1.
